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We give two generic proofs for cut elimination in propositional modal logics, interpreted
over coalgebras. We first investigate semantic coherence conditions between the axiomati-
sation of a particular logic and its coalgebraic semantics that guarantee that the cut-rule is
admissible in the ensuing sequent calculus. We then independently isolate a purely syntac-
tic property of the set of modal rules that guarantees cut elimination. Apart from the fact
that cut elimination holds, our main result is that the syntactic and semantic assumptions
are equivalent in case the logic is amenable to coalgebraic semantics. As applications we
present a new proof of the (already known) interpolation property for coalition logic and
newly establish the interpolation property for the conditional logics CK and CK + ID.
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
Establishing the admissibility of the cut-rule in a modal sequent calculus often allows proving many other properties
of the particular logic under scrutiny. If the sequent calculus enjoys the subformula property, the conservativity property
is immediate: each formula is provable using only those deductive rules that mention exclusively operators that occur in
the formula. As a consequence, completeness of the calculus at large immediately entails completeness of every subsystem
that is obtained by removing a set of modal operators and the deduction rules in which they occur. Moreover, cut-free
sequent systems admit backward proof search, as the logical complexity of a formula usually decreases when passing from
the conclusion to the premise of a deductive rule to the premise. Given that contraction is admissible in the proof calculus,
this yields – in the presence of completeness – decidability and complexity bounds for the satisfiability problem associated
with the logic under consideration [12,3]. Finally, a cut-free system provides the necessary scaffolding to prove interpolation
theorems by induction on cut-free proofs.
For normalmodal logics, sequent calculi, often in the guise of tableau systems, have therefore – not surprisingly – received
much attention in the literature [1,7,22]. In the context of non-normal logics, sequent calculi have been explored for regular
and monotonic modal logics [9], for Pauly’s coalition logic [10] and for a family of conditional logics [17]. All these logics are
coalgebraic in nature: their standard semantics can be captured by interpreting them over coalgebras for an endofunctor on
sets. This is the startingpoint of our investigation, andwe set out to derive sequent systems for logicswith coalgebraic seman-
tics and study their properties. Given a (complete) axiomatisation of a logicw.r.t. its coalgebraic semantics, we systematically
derive a (complete) sequent calculus. In general, this calculus will only be complete if we include the cut-rule. We show that
cut-free completeness, and therefore eliminability of cut, follows if the axiomatisation is one-step cut-free complete: every
valid clause containing operators applied to propositional variables can be derived using a singlemodal deduction rule. The
existence of a cut-free sequent calculus for coalgebraic logics is then exploited to establish conservativity, complexity, and
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interpolation for modal logics in a coalgebraic framework. Whilst conservativity and complexity of coalgebraic logics have
already been established in [28]we believe that the results here offer additional conceptual insight. Regarding interpolation,
we obtain a new proof of the (known) interpolation property for coalition logic [10] whilst interpolation for the conditional
logics CK and CK + ID [5] was left as future work for the (different) sequent systems considered in [17] and appears to be
new.
On a technical level, we consider modal logics that are built from atomic propositions, propositional connectives, and
modal operators, in contrast to earlier work (e.g. [13,18,24,28]) where atomic propositions were regarded as an optional
feature, incorporated into the modal similarity type as nullary modalities. This does not only provide a better alignment
with standard texts in modal logic [4,5] but is moreover a prerequisite for formulating the interpolation property. As a
consequence, we are lead to work with coalgebraic models, that is, coalgebras together with a valuation of the propositional
variables, right from the start. Completeness and cut-free completeness is then proved via a terminal sequence argument,
but over the extension of the signature functor to the slice category Set/P(V)where V is the set of propositional variables.
This provides an alternative route to the shallow proof property of [28].
In this setting, we observe that one-step cut-free completeness corresponds to eliminability of cut.We then isolate purely
syntactic conditions under which cut elimination holds. In essence, the set of modal rules has to be rich enough so that cuts
between conclusions of modal rules can be absorbed into a single rule. If the rules are moreover strong enough to propagate
contraction, we show that cut can be eliminated. This essentially amounts to completing the rule set so that cuts involving
rule conclusions are in fact absorbed in the rule set, in strong analogy with Mints’ comparison [15] between resolution
and sequent proofs. It is interesting to note that the respective strengths of the syntactic and the semantic approach are
identical: we show that the semantic coherence condition that guarantees admissibility of cut is equivalent to the syntactic
requirement which is needed for cut elimination.
We summarise the coalgebraic semantics of modal logics in Section 2 and introduce modal sequent calculi in Section 3.
Section 4 then establishes cut-free completeness semantically, whilst a purely syntactic proof of cut elimination is given in
Section 5. We discuss applications, in particular the interpolation property, in Section 6 before concluding with two open
problems.
Related work
Sequent systems, and dually tableau systems, for modal logics traditionally come in two flavours: labelled calculi employ
extended formulas that speak about states and transitions explicitly, whilst unlabelled calculi work purely with formulas of
the logic. Our generic approach employs unlabelled systems. A good overview of work on labelled systems for normalmodal
logics is found in [16], whilst unlabelled systems are surveyed in [30]. Tableau systems for normalmodal logics are discussed
in [8]. There is, as far as we are aware, only a limited amount of work on sequent systems for non-normal logics, with the
exception of [17] where labelled sequent systems for conditional logics are studied. We use conditional logic as one of two
running examples; it turns out that the treatment of unlabelled sequent systems for conditional logics is pleasantly simple,
as illustrated also in our further work onmodal sequent systems outside rank 1 [19].We do not know of a systematic general
study of sequent systems for non-normal modal logics.
Our principle of absorption of structural rules is broadly related to generic criteria for cut elimination in substructural
logics [2,6], where, however, rules are assumed to be of a format that does not fit typicalmodal rules — besides the structural
rules, there can be only left and right introduction rules for the logical connectives which introduce only one occurrence
of a connective. A general approach to cut elimination which does apply to modal logics is presented in [21]. The range
of application of this method is very wide and encompasses, e.g. first-order logic, the modal logic S4, linear logic, and
intuitionistic propositional logic. This generality is reflected in the fact that the method as a whole is substantially more
involved than ours; whether it applies also to non-normal logics in principle remains an open question.
2. Coalgebraic and logical preliminaries
Given a category C and an endofunctor F : C → C, an F-coalgebra is a pair (C, γ ) where C ∈ C is an object of C and
γ : C → FC is a morphism ofC. Amorphism between F-coalgebras (C, γ ) and (D, δ) is a morphismm : C → D ∈ C such
that δ ◦ m = Fm ◦ γ . The category of F-coalgebras will be denoted by Coalg(F).
In the sequel, we will be concerned with F-coalgebras both on the category Set of sets and (total) functions and on
the slice category Set/P(V), for V a denumerable set of propositional variables that we keep fixed throughout the paper.
Workingwith the slice categorySet/P(V) allows a convenient treatment of propositional variables. In particular, coalgebras
on Set/P(V) play the role of Kripke models, i.e. they come equipped with a valuation of propositional variables. Recall that
an object of Set/P(V) is a function f : X → P(V) and a morphism m : (X f→ P(V)) → (Y g→ P(V)) is a commuting
triangle, that is, a functionm : X → Y such that g ◦ m = f . The projection functor mapping (X → P(V)) → X is denoted
by U : Set/P(V) → Set. For the remainder of the paper, we fix an endofunctor T : Set → Set and denote its extension
to Set/P(V) by T/P(V) : (Set/P(V)) → (Set/P(V)); the functor T/P(V) maps objects f : X → P(V) to the second
projection mapping TX × P(V) → P(V). We assume w.l.o.g. that T is non-trivial, i.e. TX = ∅ for some set X; it follows that
TY = ∅ only if Y = ∅. Note that an objectM ∈ Coalg(T/P(V)) is a commuting triangle necessarily of the form
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or equivalently a triple (C, γ, ϑ) where (C, γ ) ∈ Coalg(T) and ϑ : C → P(V) is a co-valuation of the propositional
variables. Passing from the co-valuation ϑ : C → P(V) to the valuation ϑ : V → P(C) induced by the self-adjointness
of the powerset functor, we can view T/P(V)-coalgebras as T-coalgebras (C, γ ) together with a valuation of propositional
variables. T/P(V)-coalgebras therefore play the role of T-models (T-coalgebras, which we see as frames, together with
a valuation of propositional variables). In what follows, we will denote T/P(V)-coalgebras as triples (C, γ, ϑ) as above
and use Mod(T) to refer to the category Coalg(T/P(V)) of T-models. If M = (C, γ, ϑ) is a T-model, then we refer to
(C, γ ) ∈ Coalg(T) as the underlying frame ofM.
On the syntactic side, we work with modal logics over an arbitrary modal similarity type (set of modal operators with
associated arities). The set of -formulas is given by the grammar
F() 
 A, B ::= p | A ∧ B | ¬A | ♥(A1, . . . , An),
where p ∈ V and ♥ ∈  is n-ary. We use the standard definitions of the other propositional connectives, i.e. we put
A ∨ B = ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B), A → B = ¬A ∨ B, A ↔ B = (A → B) ∧ (B → A), ⊥ = p ∧ ¬p for some p ∈ V , and
 = ¬⊥. If S is a set (of formulas or variables) then(S) denotes the set {♥(s1, . . . , sn) | ♥ ∈  is n-ary, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S}
of formulas comprising exactly one application of a modality to elements of S. We denote the set of propositional for-
mulas over a set S by Prop(S). The (modal) rank of a formula A is the maximal nesting depth of modal operators in A
(0 if A does not contain any modal operators). We denote the set of propositional variables occurring in a formula A by
FV(A).
Remark 2.1. Above, we deviate slightly from the approach to propositional variables used in coalgebraic logics so far
[13,18,24,28]: instead of emulating propositional variables as nullarymodal operators, interpreted over T×P(V)-coalgebras
in Set, we treat propositional variables as syntactic entities in their own right, and interpret them over T/P(V)-coalgebras
in Set/P(V). As indicated in Section 1, this is motivated by the desire to stay as close as possible to the standard treatment
of modal logic. In particular, the distinction between variables and modal operators has a bearing on the stratification by
modal rank that pervades our exposition both semantically and syntactically: traditionally, and also according to the above
definition, a propositional variable p is regarded as ‘non-modal’; in particular, the formula p has rank 0. Contrastingly, if p is
emulated as a modal operator, then the formula p has rank 1. Further technical implications of this distinction are discussed
in Section 4.
To facilitate induction on the modal rank of a formula, we stratify the set F() by modal rank. That is, we put
F−1() = ∅ and Fn() = Prop((Fn−1()) ∪ V)
for n ≥ 0. It is easy to see that F() = ⋃n∈ω Fn().
An S-substitution is a mapping σ : V → S. We denote the result of simultaneously substituting σ(p) for every p ∈ V
in a formula A ∈ F() by Aσ . As usual, substitution associates to the left, i.e. Aσρ = (Aσ)ρ for formulas A ∈ F() and
substitutions σ, ρ : V → F().
As in [18,23], formulas of F() are interpreted over T-coalgebras provided that T extends to a -structure, i.e. comes
equipped with an assignment of predicate liftings (natural transformations)
♥ : 2n → 2 ◦ T
to every n-arymodal operator♥ ∈ . Here 2 : Setop → Set is the contravariant powerset functor, and for any functor F , Fn
denotes the n-fold product of F with itself, i.e. Fn(X) = FX × · · · × FX . Explicitly, the naturality equation for ♥ translates
into the requirement that ♥ commutes with inverse images, i.e.
♥X(f−1[Z1], . . . , f−1[Zn]) = (Tf )−1[♥Y (Z1, . . . , Zn)]
for all maps f : X → Y and all subsets Z1, . . . , Zn ⊆ Y . We usually leave the assignment of predicate liftings to modal
operators implicit and simply use T to refer to the entire-structure.
Given a-structure T andM = (C, γ, ϑ) ∈ Mod(T), the semantics of A ∈ F() is inductively given by
♥(A1, . . . , An)M = γ−1 ◦ ♥C(A1M, . . . , AnM)
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and
pM = {c ∈ C | p ∈ ϑ(c)}
for p ∈ V , together with the standard clauses for the propositional connectives.
If M = (C, γ, ϑ) is a T-model, semantic validity AM = C is denoted by M | A. We writeMod(T) | A if M | A for
allM ∈ Mod(T).
The completeness results that we establish later rely heavily on exploiting the semantic relation between formulas
of Prop(V) (describing properties of states) and formulas of Prop((V)) that describe properties of successors, in close
analogy to coalgebra structures mapping states (elements of C) to successors in TC. The following notation is convenient for
this purpose:
If A ∈ Prop(V), then every valuation τ : V → P(X) inductively defines a subset AτX ⊆ X by evaluation in the Boolean
algebra P(X), and we write X, τ | A if AτX = X . For statements about successor states, i.e. formulas A ∈ Prop((V)), we
have that every valuation τ : V → P(X) induces a subset AτTX ⊆ TX given by inductively extending the assignment
♥(p1, . . . , pn)τTX = ♥V (τ (p1), . . . , τ (pn))
on atoms to the whole of Prop((V)). We write TX, τ | A if AτTX = TX .
Our techniques will be illustrated by the following two running examples.
Example 2.2 (Coalition logic and conditional logic).
(i) Coalition logic [20] allows reasoning about coalitional power in games. We take N = {1, . . . , n} to be a fixed set of
agents, subsets of which are called coalitions. The similarity type  of coalition logic contains a unary modal operator [C]
for every coalition C ⊆ N. Informally, [C]A expresses that coalition C has a collaborative strategy to force A. The coalgebraic
semantics for coalition logic is based on the signature functor C defined by
CX = {(S1, . . . , Sn, f ) | ∅ = Si ⊆ N finite for all i; f : ∏i∈N Si → X}.
(In order to enable arguments that use the terminal sequence ofC, we restrict to finite rather than arbitrary sets of strategies
to ensure thatC is really set-valued, in contrast to earlier uses of this examplewherewe did not need toworry about functors
being class-valued [28]. We thus obtain a more restrictive semantics of coalition logic than considered in [20]; however, we
retain weak completeness of the rule set to be introduced in Example 3.6 as discussed in Example 4.16). The elements ofCX
are understood as strategic games with set X of states, i.e. tuples consisting of non-empty finite sets Si ⊆ N of strategies for
all agents i, and an outcome function (
∏
Si) → X . A C-coalgebra is a game frame [20] (with finite strategy sets.) We denote
the set
∏
i∈C Si by SC , and for σC ∈ SC, σC¯ ∈ SC¯ , where C¯ = N − C, (σC, σC¯) denotes the obvious element of
∏
i∈N Si. A
-structure over C is defined by the predicate liftings
[C]X(B) = {(S1, . . . , Sn, f ) ∈ CX | ∃σC ∈ SC .∀σC¯ ∈ SC¯ . f (σC, σC¯) ∈ B}.
(ii) The similarity typeof the conditional logicsCK andCK + ID contains the single binarymodal operator⇒ that represents
a non-monotonic conditional. The selection function semantics of CK is captured coalgebraically via the functor CKX =
(2(X) → P(X)) with → representing function space, and CK-coalgebras are standard conditional models [5]. We extend
CK to a-structure by virtue of the predicate lifting
 ⇒ X(A, B) = {f : 2X → PX | f (A) ⊆ B}
which induces the standard semantics of CK . The conditional logic CK + ID additionally obeys the axiom A ⇒ A and is
interpreted over the functor CKIdX = {f : 2(X) → P(X) | ∀A ⊆ X.f (A) ⊆ A}; note that CKId is a subfunctor of CK. The
functor CKId extends to a-structure by relativising the interpretation of⇒ given above, i.e.
 ⇒ X(A, B) = {f ∈ CKIdX | f (A) ⊆ B}
for subsets A, B ⊆ X . One possible way to understand a conditional model ξ : X → (2(X) → P(X)) is to regard ξ(x)(A) as
the ‘typical’ worlds for property A from the perspective of world x; the restriction imposed by CKId then states that typical
A-worlds actually belong to A.
3. Sequent systems for coalgebraic logics
We proceed to define a generic Gentzen-style sequent system for coalgebraic modal logics, thus complementing earlier
work on Hilbert systems [18,24,28]. The system will be parametrised over a set of modal rules of the same format as in the
Hilbert systems, so that the same data determine both a Hilbert and a Gentzen system.
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If S ⊆ F() is a set of formulas, an S-sequent, or just a sequent in case S = F(), is a finite multiset of elements of
S ∪ {¬A | A ∈ S} (following [29], we opt to treat sequents as multisets rather than sets in order to make the crucial issue
of contraction more explicit). We write S(S) for the set of S-sequents, and S for the set of F()-sequents. As the logics we
consider here are extensions of classical propositional logic, we work with single-sided sequent calculi and read sequents
disjunctively. That is, a sequent corresponds to the disjunction of its elements, and we write ˇ = ∨ for the associated
formula. We use the standard set-theoretic notation of union and subset also for multisets, respecting multiplicity; i.e. for
multisets,, wewrite ⊆  if every element that is contained inwithmultiplicity n is contained inwithmultiplicity
at least n, and  ∪  denotes the multiset that contains x with multiplicity n + mwhenever  contains x with multiplicity
n and  contains x with multiplicity m. We write supp() for the support of , i.e. the set of elements of , disregarding
multiplicities; sets, in turn, are implicitly regarded asmultisetswith allmultiplicities atmost 1. For example, if ⊆ supp()
for multisets ,, thenmust be a set, i.e. cannot contain duplicates. We identify a formula Awith the singleton sequent
{A} whenever convenient and denote the multiset union of sequents  and  by ,. Combining both conventions, we
write , A for  ∪ {A}.
Substitutions are applied pointwise to sequents: if σ is a substitution and  is a sequent, σ = {Aσ | A ∈ }. In our
terminology, a sequent rule is a tuple of sequents, usually written in the form
1 . . . n
0
or 1 . . . n/0,
where we silently identify sequent rules modulo reordering of the sequents in the premise.
Given a set S of sequent rules and a set H ⊆ S of additional hypotheses, the notion of deduction is standard: proofs
are finite trees with nodes labelled by sequents, constructed inductively from the rules in S (the rules themselves, not
substitution instances thereof) and the hypotheses in H. We write S + H  , and say that  is S + H-derivable, if there
exists such a proof of ; in case H = ∅, we write S instead of S+ H. The depth of a proof is its depth as a tree. A sequent rule
1 . . . n/0 is (depth-preserving) S-admissible if whenever S  i for all i = 1, . . . , n (with proofs of depth at most n for
some n), then S  0 (with a proof of depth at most n).
Remark 3.1. Note that theabovenotionofderivability explicitlydoesnotallowsubstituting into sequent rules. This facilitates
restriction of the rule set in inductive proofs, e.g. to rules of bounded modal rank. The full rule set governing a given modal
logic has closure under substitution built in; see Definition 3.5.
We use the following set G of sequent rules to account for the propositional part of our calculus
(Ax)
, p,¬p (∧)
, A , B
, A ∧ B (¬∧)
,¬A,¬B
,¬(A ∧ B) (¬¬)
, A
,¬¬A ,
where p ∈ V , A, B ∈ F() and  ∈ S . We adopt the context-free version of the cut-rule, writing C for the set of rules of the
form
(cut)
, A ,¬A
,
,
where , ∈ S and A ∈ F(). For the purpose of arguments by induction on the modal rank of a formula, we write
Sn =
{
1 . . . k
0
∈ S | i ∈ S(Fn()) for all i = 0, . . . , k
}
for the set of rules in S whose premises and conclusions are restricted to sequents over Fn(). In particular, this induces
the sets Gn and Cn containing the propositional rules and instances of the cut-rule, applied to formulas of modal rank at
most n. We denote the union of sequent rule sets by juxtaposition; e.g. GC is propositional reasoningwith cut, i.e. the system
comprised of the rules of G and those of C. Juxtaposition binds more strongly than rank restriction; e.g. GCn denotes (GC)n
(not G(Cn)).
The system G appears under the name G3c in [29], where the meticulous reader may find proofs of both soundness and
completeness. We note a few basic completeness properties of G:
Proposition 3.2.
1. The system G is complete w.r.t. propositional validity, i.e. G   iff ˇ is a propositional tautology.
2. The system GC is complete for propositional consequence, i.e. for a set  of sequents, GC +    iff ˇ is a propositional
consequence of {ˇ |  ∈ }.
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Proof. (i) Straightforward induction on the complexity of .
(ii) If ˇ is a logical consequence of {ˇ |  ∈ }, then there exist1, . . . , n ∈  such that ¬ˇ1 ∧ . . .¬ˇn → ˇ is a
propositional tautology. By (i), we have G  ¬ˇ1, . . . ,¬ˇn, , and hence GC +   . 
Our next task is to extend Gwith additional sequent rules to account for modal deduction. It has been shown in [23] that
coalgebraic logics can always be completely axiomatised in rank 1, i.e. by a (possibly infinite) number of one-step rules, that
is, rules whose premise is a purely propositional formula and which have a purely modalised conclusion.
Definition 3.3. A one-step rule over a modal similarity type  is an n + 1-tuple of sequents i ∈ S(V), i = 1, . . . , n, and
∅ = 0 ∈ S((V)), written as 1...n0 or 1 . . . n/0.
Remark 3.4. It is clear that one-step rules as defined above have the same expressive power as a more general type of
rules where one allows 0 ∈ S((Prop(V))), as one can just introduce additional premises that abbreviate propositional
formulas to single propositional variables. Typically, however, the natural formulation of the rules already has the format
required above. For instance, the normal modal logic K can be axiomatised by the family of one-step rules
(RKn)
¬a1, . . . ,¬an, b
¬a1, . . . ,¬an,b (n ≥ 0),
(where RK0 is the necessitation rule b/b, and the K-axiom (a → b) → (a → b), dissolved into the sequent¬(a → b),¬a,b, may be derived by RK2 from the tautologous sequent ¬(a → b),¬a, b). We illustrate this further
in Example 3.6.
One-step rules describe the passage from statements about states (the premises) to a statement about successors (in the
conclusion), analogously to the way in which the structure map γ : C → TC of a T-coalgebra (C, γ ) provides us with a
(structured) successor state for each world c ∈ C of the model.
Thedefinition abovediffers slightly from that given in [18,23] in the sense that one-step rules in op.cit. are of the formφ/ψ
where φ ∈ Prop(V) is a purely propositional formula andψ is a clause over atoms in(V). By passing from a propositional
formula φ to its conjunctive normal form, every one-step rule in the sense of [18,23] can be accommodated in the above
definition in a straightforward way.
Every set of one-step rules gives rise to a set of sequent rules by passing from a one-step rule to all its substitution
instances, augmented with an additional weakening context. The latter is standardly used in modal sequent rules in order
to make the weakening rule admissible.
Definition 3.5. Let R be a set of one-step rules. The set S(R) of sequent rules associated with R consists of all (substitution)
instances of R, i.e. all rules
1σ . . . nσ
0σ,
,
where 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R, σ : V → F() is a substitution, and ∈ S .
For our two running examples, the situation is as follows.
Example 3.6 (Coalition logic and conditional logic).
(i) In [28], coalition logic has been axiomatised by the rules
∨k
i=1 ¬ai∨k
i=1 ¬[Ci]ai
∧k
i=1 ai → b ∨
∨l
j=1 cj∧k
i=1[Ci]ai → [D]b ∨
∨l
j=1[N]cj
subject to the side condition that the Ci are pairwise disjoint; the second rule additionally requires that Ci ⊆ D for all i =
1, . . . , k. These rules are one-step rules if we dissolve premise and conclusion into sequents, i.e. if we replace propositional
clauses
∧
i=1,...,n Ai → ∨j=1,...,m Bj by sequents ¬A1, . . . ,¬An, B1, . . . , Bm. The arising set RC of one-step rules is most
economically presented if we abbreviate A = A1, . . . , Ak for A1, . . . , Ak ∈ V and C = (C1, . . . , Ck) for C1, . . . , Ck ⊆ N; in
this case [C]A represents the sequent [C1]A1, . . . , [Ck]Ak . In this notation, RC consists of the rules
(A)
¬A
¬[C]A (B)
¬A, B,A’
¬[C]A, [D]B, [N]A’ ,
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where N = N, . . . ,N and ¬ = {¬A | A ∈ } for  ∈ S . Both rule schemas are subject to the side condition that the
coalitions appearing in C are disjoint; rule (B)moreover requires that their union is a subset of D.
(ii) The axiomatisation of the conditional logic CK in [5] consists of the rules
(RCK)
∧
i=1,...,n bi → b0∧
i=1,...,n(a ⇒ bi) → (a ⇒ b0) (RE)
a ↔ a′
(a ⇒ b) → (a′ ⇒ b)
fromwhich we obtain a set RCK0 of one-step rules by replacing a ↔ a′ with the sequents¬a, a′ and¬a′, a in (RE). Merging
these rules yields the rule set RCK consisting of the one-step rules
(C)
¬b1, . . . ,¬bn, b0 ¬a0, a1 . . . ¬a0, an ¬a1, a0 . . . ¬an, a0
¬(a1 ⇒ b1), . . . ,¬(an ⇒ bn), (a0 ⇒ b0)
for every n ∈ ω. (It is clear that these rules are derivable from (RCK) and (RE). Conversely, RCK contains (RE) as the case for
n = 1, and (RCK) can be derived using the axiom rule of G.) As above, we abbreviate B = B1, . . . , Bn, A = A1, . . . , An and
A ⇒ B = A1 ⇒ B1, . . . , An ⇒ Bn. The rules (C) can then be written in the form
(C)
¬B, B0 ¬A0, A1 . . . ¬A0, An ¬A1, A0 . . . ¬An, A0
¬(A ⇒ B), A0 ⇒ B0 .
The rules (C) express that the second argument of ⇒ obeys normality whereas the first behaves like the modal  of
neighbourhood frames. The set of one-step rules needed to axiomatise CK + ID contains the additional rule
(ID)
¬A0, A1 ¬A1, A0
A0 ⇒ A1
which is equivalent to the identity axiom A ⇒ A used in Hilbert-style formulations of CK + ID. Integrating (C) and (ID) into
a single rule schema, we let the set RCKId consist of the rules
(CI)
¬A0,¬B, B0 ¬A0, A1 . . . ¬A0, An ¬A1, A0 . . . ¬An, A0
¬(A ⇒ B), A0 ⇒ B0 .
It is the special format of one-step rules that facilitates inductive arguments over the modal rank of formulas. For the
case of one-step rules, we have the following characterisation.
Lemma 3.7. Let R be a set of one-step rules. Then
S(R)n =
{
1σ . . . kσ
0σ,
| 1 . . . k/0 ∈ R, σ : V → Fn−1(), ∈ S(Fn())
}
(using the notation Sn for sets S of sequent rules introduced earlier).
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. 
In the remainder of the paper, we will use sequent calculi that are induced by several different rule sets. In particular, we
will consider sequent calculi with and without cut, and also calculi whose rules are restricted to formulas of fixed modal
rank. This is reflected by the following convention.
Convention 3.8. If S1, . . . , Sn are sets of sequent rules and H1, . . . ,Hk ⊆ S is a set of additional hypotheses, we use the
short form and write
S1 . . . Sn + H1 + . . . + Hm  
in case (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn) + (H1 ∪ · · · ∪ Hm)   for  ∈ S . Moreover, if R is a set of one-step rules, we write GR for the rule
set G ∪ S(R). As a consequence, note that GRn = Gn ∪ (S(R))n for n ∈ ω.
We start our analysis of the provability predicate GR  by establishing that weakening and inversion are admissible in
the relativised calculi GRn. This is most easily established using the following characterisation of GRn-provability: a sequent
is GRn-provable iff it is Gn-provable from the set of conclusions of S(R)n-rules whose premises are GRn−1-provable. That is,
we have the following.
1454 D. Pattinson, L. Schröder / Information and Computation 208 (2010) 1447–1468
Lemma 3.9. Let R be a set of one-step rules and n ∈ ω. Then GRn   iff
Gn + {0σ, | 1 . . . k/0 ∈ R,  ∈ S(Fn()),
σ : V → Fn−1(),∀1≤i≤k(GRn−1  iσ)}  
whenever  ∈ S(Fn()).
The proof relies on the following fact.
Lemma 3.10. For  ∈ S(Fn()), GR   iff GRn  .
Proof. ‘If’ is trivial. ‘Only if’ is a standard induction on the GR-proof of  where we use that backwards application of the
rules in GR does not increase modal rank. 
Proof of Lemma 3.9. ‘If’ is trivial. To prove ‘only if’, we proceed by induction on the GRn-proof of . The cases for the
propositional rules, i.e. the rules of Gn, are trivial. So assume that GRn   has been established using a modal rule in
S(R)n. By Lemma 3.7 we find a one-step rule 1 . . . k/0, a substitution σ : V → Fn−1() and ∈ S(Fn()) such that
 = 0σ, and GRn  iσ for all i = 1, . . . , k. Then iσ ∈ S(Fn−1()), whence GRn−1  iσ for i = 1, . . . , k by
Lemma 3.10. This proves the claim. 
One ingredient in the construction of sequent rules fromone-step ruleswas the addition of aweakening context (, in the
notation of Definition 3.5) to the conclusion of every substituted one-step rule. As a consequence, weakening is admissible.
Lemma 3.11 (Weakening lemma). Let R be a set of one-step rules. Then GRn  , A whenever GRn   and A ∈ Fn().
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3.9 and the fact (proved by a straightforward induction over proofs) that weakening is
admissible in Gn + H for a set H of hypotheses, provided that H is closed under weakening. 
The same argument allows us to prove that inversion, i.e. converse application of the rules (∧), (¬∧), and (¬¬) for
the propositional connectives, is admissible. For future reference, we formulate admissibility of inversion for propositional
reasoning with hypotheses explicitly.
Lemma 3.12. Let H ⊆ S(Fn()) be closed under inversion (i.e. if A ∧ B ∈ H then A ∈ H and B ∈ H, etc.). Then
1. Gn + H  , A and Gn + H  , B whenever Gn + H  , A ∧ B
2. Gn + H  , A whenever Gn + H  ,¬¬A
3. Gn + H  ,¬A,¬B whenever Gn + H  ,¬(A ∧ B)
with proofs of at most the same depth.
Proof. This is as in [29], where the hypotheses in H play the role of axioms. 
The modal inversion lemma can now be formulated as follows:
Lemma 3.13 (Inversion lemma). Let n ∈ ω, and let R be a set of one-step rules. Then all instances of the inversion rules
,¬¬A
, A
,¬(A1 ∧ A2)
,¬A1,¬A2
, A1 ∧ A2
, A1
, A1 ∧ A2
, A2
,
where A1, A2 ∈ Fn() and  ∈ S(Fn()), are depth-preserving GRn-admissible.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3.9 and 3.12, noting that the set of hypotheses in the statement of Lemma 3.9 is trivially
closed under inversion, as conclusions of one-step rules never contain top-level propositional connectives except isolated
occurrences of¬. 
Finally, we show thatGRC-derivability is closed under uniform substitution. Again, this is carried out relative to themodal
rank of formulas. From now on, we denote the set of non-atomic axioms of rank at most k by
Axk = {¬A, A,  | A ∈ Fk(),  ∈ S(Fk())}.
Lemma 3.14 (Substitution lemma). Let R be a set of one-step rules, let H ⊆ S(Fn()), and suppose that GRCn + H  . If
σ : V → Fk(), then GRCn+k + Axk + {Aσ | A ∈ H}  σ .
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Proof. Induction on the proof of GRCn + H  , where the hypotheses Axk take care of the case for the rule (Ax). 
By Lemmas 3.10, 3.11, and 3.13 entail the admissibility of weakening and inversion also in the full calculus GR; we refrain
from stating this formally as we shall need only the bounded-rank versions in the sequel.
Finally, we note a weaker form of Lemma 3.10 that applies to the system with cut:
Proposition 3.15. Let R be a set of one-step rules, and let  ∈ S . Then GRC   iff GRCn   for some n ∈ ω.
Proof. As GRC is finitary, any proof in GRC can be simulated in GRCn where n is large enough, i.e. such that all formulas
occurring in the proof are elements of Fn(). (Formally, this argument amounts to a simple proof by induction over the
structure of proofs in GRC.) 
This concludes our discussion of the basic properties of sequent systems induced by one-step rules. The next two sections
are devoted to establish admissibility of cut and contraction, first semantically in the next section and then by a purely
syntactic argument.
4. Soundness and cut-free completeness
We now study the relationship between GR-derivability and semantic validity. As in previous work, soundness and
completeness will be implied by one-step soundness and one-step completeness, respectively, of the rule set R. The proof
of this known fact that we present here will, however, shed additional light on the structure of proofs. In particular, we will
see that a one-step complete rule set in general necessitates the use of cut to obtain completeness, whilst eliminability of
cut amounts to one-step cut-free completeness.
We recall the definition of one-step soundness and one-step completeness, adapted from [18,23] to a sequent calculus
setting . Here, we liberally extend notation introduced for formulas in Section 2 to sequents in the obvious way by regarding
sequents as disjunctions of formulas; e.g. FV() = FV(ˇ), and M = ˇM for a T-modelM.
Definition 4.1. A set R of one-step rules is one-step sound (w.r.t. the-structure T) if, whenever 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R, we have
TX, τ | 0 for each set X and each valuation τ : V → P(X) such that X, τ | i for all i = 1, . . . , n. The set R is one-step
complete if
GC1 + {0σ, |  ∈ S((V)), 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R,
σ : V → Prop(V),∀1≤i≤n(X, τ | iσ)}  
(1)
whenever TX, τ |  for a set X ,  ∈ S((V)), and a P(X)-valuation τ . Finally, R is one-step cut-free complete if it satisfies
the same condition, but with GC1 replaced by G1.
Remark 4.2. In the definition of one-step completeness, we may equivalently omit the weakening context  appearing
in the entailment (1), since weakening is derivable under the cut-rule. For one-step cut-free completeness, however, the
weakening context is essential.
In the sequel, we will work with the following reformulation of one-step cut-free completeness.
Lemma 4.3. A set R of one-step rules is one-step cut-free complete iff whenever TX, τ |  for  ∈ S((V)), we have
0σ ⊆ 
for some 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R and some renaming σ : V → V such that X, τ | iσ for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. ‘If’ is trivial. ‘Only if’: By the definition of one-step cut-free completeness, we have G +    for  = {0σ, |
 ∈ S((V)), 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R, σ : V → Prop(V),∀1≤i≤n(X, τ | iσ)}. As  ∈ S((V)), the ‘last’ step in the
corresponding proof cannot involve any of the rules of G1 (including the axiom rule, because none of the formulas in  is
atomic). Therefore,  must be one of the hypotheses in 0σ, ∈  , where necessarily σ(a) ∈ V for all a ∈ FV(0); this
proves the claim. 
Remark 4.4. Note that the above definition of one-step (cut-free) completeness deviates slightly from definitions of (strict)
one-step completeness we have used previously [24,28] in that the axiom rule is excluded in propositional reasoning over
(V). As a consequence, one-step complete rule sets in the sense of the present work always implicitly contain the congru-
ence rule
¬a1, b1 . . . ¬ak, bk ¬b1, a1 . . . ¬bk, ak
¬♥(a1, . . . , an),♥(b1, . . . , bn)
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for every k-arymodal operator♥ ∈ . This is formulated andprovedexplicitly for the caseof one-step cut-free completeness
in Section 5; the situation is similar with one-step completeness.
Theabovenotionsofone-stepsoundness, completeness, andcut-freecompletenessmayequivalentlybe restricted tofinite
sets, i.e. the relevant conditions are required tohold for allfinite setsX rather than for all setsX .We indicate the corresponding
restricted notions by the qualification ‘on finite sets’. For later use, we note this explicitly for one-step completeness.
Proposition 4.5. A set R of one-step rules is one-step complete iff R is one-step complete on finite sets.
(Up to adaptation of terminology and notation, the above statement has appeared, without proof, as Proposition 3.10
in [25].)
Proof. ‘Only if’ is trivial. To prove ‘if’, let TX, τ |  for a (possibly infinite) set X ,  ∈ S((V)), and a P(X)-valuation τ .
Let 2 denote the set {⊥,}. The valuation τ induces a map X → 2FV(), whose image we denote by Xτ , so that we have a
surjective map τ¯ : X → Xτ . As FV() is finite, Xτ is a finite set. We define the P(Xτ )-valuation τ ∗ by τ ∗(a) = {κ ∈ Xτ ⊆
2FV() | κ(a) = }. Then τ¯−1[τ ∗(a)] = τ(a): we have x ∈ τ(a) iff τ¯ (x)(a) =  iff τ¯ (x) ∈ τ ∗(a) iff x ∈ τ¯−1[τ ∗(a)]. Using
naturality of predicate liftings and commutation of preimage with Boolean operations, we thus obtain that TXτ , τ
∗ | .
By assumption, this implies
GC1 +
{
0σ | 1 . . . n
0
∈ R, σ : V → Prop(V),∀1≤i≤n(Xτ , τ ∗ | iσ)
}
 .
By commutation of preimage with Boolean operations, Xτ , τ
∗ | iσ iff X, τ | iσ , which implies the claim. 
It is best to understand the notions introduced above as coherence conditions between the axiomatisation of a particular
logic using one-step rules and its semantics, given in terms of predicate liftings. In particular, they can be checked without
reference to (coalgebraic) models, by comparing the interpretation of propositional formulas (premises of one-step rules)
over a set X with the interpretation of purely modalised formulas (the conclusions) over the set TX . In a nutshell, one-step
soundness asserts that a rule conclusion is valid over the set TX of structured successors whenever all its premises are
valid over the set X . Dually, one-step completeness requires that whenever a purely modalised sequent is valid over TX , it
can be derived – with the help of cut – from the conclusions of one-step rules whose premises are valid over X . Finally,
one-step cut-free completeness asserts that valid sequents can be obtained from the conclusion of a one-step rule purely in
terms of weakening. The following example highlights the difference between one-step completeness and one-step cut-free
completeness.
Example 4.6. We consider the modal logic K (see e.g. [4]) interpreted over coalgebras for the powerset functor TX = P(X).
The syntax of K is given by the similarity type  = {} that contains a single, unary operator. The functor T extends to a
-structure by putting
X(A) = {B ∈ TX | B ⊆ A}
which gives rise to the standard semantics of K . We show that the rule set
(K)
¬p1, . . . ,¬pn, p0
¬p1, . . . ,¬pn,p0 (n ≥ 0)
is one-step cut-free complete, leaving the routine verification of one-step soundness to the reader. Thus let X be a set, let
τ : V → P(X), and let  = ¬p1, . . . ,¬pn,q1, . . . ,qk ∈ S((V)) such that TX, τ | , i.e.⋂
i=1,...,n
X(τ (pi)) ⊆
⋃
j=1,...,k
X(τ (qj)).
By the definition of , we have ⋂i=1,...,n τ(pi) ∈ ⋂i=1,...,n X(τ (pi)), so that by the above set inclusion there exists
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
(†)
⋂
i=1,...,n
τ(pi) ⊆ τ(qj).
This means that X, τ | ¬p1, . . . ,¬pn, qj , and applying (K) we derive the sequent ¬p1, . . . ,¬pn,qj which is con-
tained in  as required.
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Contrastingly, consider the rule set consisting of necessitation (N) and distribution (D)
(N)
p
p (D)
¬p,¬qj, r
¬p,¬qj,r .
This set is one-step sound (being a subset of the previous one) and one-step complete, but not one-step cut-free complete.
One-step completeness follows from the fact that, as shown by a simple induction, all rules of (K) are derivable using
(N) and (D); however, this requires cut. We refrain from proving the failure of strict one-step completeness formally, and
instead illustrate how cut comes up in the proof of one-step completeness. Consider, e.g., the case n = 3 in the above proof.
Then we have that X, τ | ¬(p1 ∧ p2),¬p3, qj and X, τ | ¬p1,¬p2, p1 ∧ p2. By two applications of (D), we derive¬(p1 ∧ p2),¬p3,qj and¬p1,¬p2,(p1 ∧ p2), and we need to use (cut) to derive¬p1,¬p2,¬p3,qj .
It is an easy exercise to show that both GR and GRC are sound provided the rule set R is one-step sound. Recall that the
interpretation of a sequent  w.r.t.M ∈ Mod(V) is the semantics of the associated propositional formula, i.e. M = ˇM ,
and accordinglyM |  iffM | ˇ,Mod(T) |  ifMod(T) | ˇ.
Theorem 4.7 (Soundness). Let R be one-step sound for T. Then Mod(T) |  if GRC   and, a fortiori, Mod(T) |  if
GR  .
Proof. We proceed by induction over the length of the derivation, where the only interesting cases are applications of
rules 1 . . . n/0 ∈ S(R). So suppose that M = (C, γ, ϑ) ∈ Mod(T) and that  has been derived via an application of
1 . . . n/0. That is, we have
′
1 . . . 
′
n/
′
0 ∈ R and a substitution σ : V → F() such thati = ′iσ for i = 1, . . . , n and
0 = ′0σ, for some  ∈ S . By the induction hypothesis, iσ M =  for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let τ be the P(C)-valuation
defined by τ(p) = σ(p)M; note that ′0σ M = γ−1[′0τTC]. We obtain C, τ | ′i for all i = 1, . . . , n, and one-step
soundness implies TC, τ | ′0. Consequently, 0M = ′0σ,M ⊇ ′0σ M = γ−1[′0τTC] = γ−1[TC] = C. 
We now proceed to establish completeness and cut-free completeness directly by means of a semantic argument, and
present a purely syntactic reconstruction in the following section. For the semantic approach, we prove completeness using
a terminal sequence argument in the style of [18], which ties in well with the proof of cut elimination in the next section. As
we are dealingwithmodels, i.e. coalgebras equippedwith a valuation, we consider the terminal sequence of the endofunctor
T/P(V) in the category Set/P(V). We briefly recapitulate the terminal sequence construction, as used in [18] but phrased
in a general categorical setting.
If F : C → C is an endofunctor on a category C with terminal object 1 and unique morphisms A → 1 denoted !A (or
just ‘!’), the finitary part of the terminal sequence of F is the diagram consisting of
• the objects Fn1 for n ∈ ω, where Fn denotes n-fold application of F , and
• the morphisms pn : Fn+11 → Fn1 defined for n ∈ ω by pn = Fn(!F1).
Every F-coalgebra (C, γ ) gives rise to a canonical cone (C, (γn : C → Fn1)n∈ω) over the finitary part of the terminal sequence
defined by γ0 =!C : C → 1 = F01 and γn+1 = Fγn ◦ γ . The terminal sequence of the functor F = T/P(V) is visualised in
the following diagram (observing that the terminal object of Set/P(V) is 1 × P(V)).
S0︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 × P(V)
π2

S1︷ ︸︸ ︷
TS0 × P(V)
π2

p0=!×id S2︷ ︸︸ ︷
TS1 × P(V)
π2

p1=Tp0×id . . .p2=Tp1×id
P(V) P(V) P(V) . . .
Remark 4.8. At first sight, the upper row of the above diagram looks identical to the terminal sequence of the functor
T × P(V) on Set. Note however that the above sequence begins with 1 × P(V), thus already capturing the interpretation
of propositional variables at S0, whilst the terminal sequence of T × P(V) begins with 1.
The key technique in the proof of completeness via a terminal sequence argument is to associate to every formula A of
modal rank ≤ n an n-step semantics An over the n-th approximant (T/P(V))n1 of the terminal sequence. In our case, we
take a predicate over (T/P(V))n1 to be a subset of Sn = U((T/P(V))n1). The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 4.9. The n-step semantics of A ∈ Fn() ⊆ Sn is inductively defined by S0 = P(V) and
p0 = {S ∈ P(V) | p ∈ S},
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and Sn = TSn−1 × P(V) together with
pn = π−12 [{S ∈ P(V) | p ∈ S}]
and
♥(A1, . . . , Ak)n = π−11 [♥Sn−1(A1n−1, . . . , Akn−1)]
for n > 0, A1, . . . , Ak ∈ Fn−1() and♥ ∈  a k-ary modality.
Note that Sn = U((T/P(V))n1). We can mediate between the n-step semantics and the semantics w.r.t Mod(T) as
follows:
Lemma 4.10. Let A ∈ Fn(), let M = (C, γ, ϑ) ∈ Mod(T), and let (M, (γn)n∈ω) be the canonical cone of M over the terminal
sequence of T/P(V). Then AM = (Uγn)−1[An] for all A ∈ Fn().
Proof. By induction on n. For n = 0 we have Uγ0 = ϑ and ϑ−1[p0] = ϑ−1[{S ⊆ V | p ∈ S}] = {c ∈ C |
p ∈ ϑ(c)} = pM . For n > 0, we obtain inductively Uγn = 〈TUγn−1 ◦ γ, ϑ〉 : C → TSn−1 × P(V). This gives
(Uγn)
−1[pn] = (π2 ◦ 〈TUγn ◦ γ, ϑ〉)−1[{S ⊆ V | p ∈ S}] = ϑ−1[{S ⊆ V | p ∈ S}] = {c ∈ C | p ∈ ϑ(c)} = pM as
above. The cases for Boolean operators are easily discharged using commutation of preimage with Boolean set operations.
For modal formulas♥(A1, . . . , Ak)with A1, . . . , Ak ∈ Fn−1()we obtain
(Uγn)
−1[♥(A1, . . . , Akn)]
= 〈TUγn−1 ◦ γ, ϑ〉−1[π−11 [♥Sn−1(A1n−1, . . . , Akn−1)]]
= γ−1[(TUγn−1)−1[♥Sn−1(A1n−1, . . . , Akn−1)]]
= γ−1[♥C((Uγn−1)−1[A1n−1] × . . . × (Uγn−1)−1[Akn−1])]
= γ−1[♥(A1M, . . . , AkM)]
= ♥(A1, . . . , Ak)M
using the induction hypothesis and naturality of ♥. 
We recall the following lemma, whose proof directly translates to a general categorical setting, from [18]:
Lemma 4.11. Let f 0 : 1 → F1 be a morphism of C and let f n = Fn(f 0) : Fn1 → Fn+11, an F-coalgebra on Fn1. Then the
component f nn of the canonical cone (F
n1, (f nk : Fn1 → Fk1)k∈ω) is idFn1 for all n ∈ ω.
This immediately implies that validity of a sequent  ∈ S(Fn()) is equivalent to validity w.r.t. the n-step semantics:
Corollary 4.12. Let  ∈ S(Fn()). ThenMod(T) |  iff n = .
Proof. The ‘if’-part is a consequence of Lemma 4.10 above. For the ‘only if’-part assume that Mod(T) |  and pick
f 0 : 1 → (T/P(V))(1) in Set/P(V)where 1 is the terminal object of Set/P(V) (f 0 exists by our global assumption that T is
non-trivial). ConsiderM = (C, γ ) ∈ Coalg(T/P(V))where C = (T/P(V))n(1) and γ = (T/P(V))n(f 0). AsMod(T) | 
we have thatM | , and by Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11, it follows that n = . 
The proof of (cut-free) completeness relies on the stratification of the provability predicate GRn  of GR, indexed by
modal rank. The following proposition is the key stepping stone in the completeness proof, relating validity in the n-step
semantics to derivability in rank n.
Proposition 4.13. Let  ∈ S(Fn()) be a sequent over Fn() such that n = . If R is one-step complete, then GRCn  ,
and if R is one-step cut-free complete, then GRn  .
Proof. By induction on n. If n = 0 the statement follows from completeness of G. By the inversion lemma (Lemma 3.13), it
suffices to consider, for n > 0, the case
 = ¬♥1A1, . . . ,¬♥kAk,¬q1, . . . ,¬qm,♥′1A′1, . . . ,♥′k′A′k′ , q′1, . . . , q′m′ ,
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where the Ai, A
′
i′ are tuples of formulas in Fn−1() according to the arity of ♥i and ♥′i′ and qj, q′j′ ∈ V . By the definition of
 · n and elementary Boolean algebra, we deduce that either
¬♥1A1, . . . ,¬♥kAk,♥′1A′1, . . . ,♥′k′A′k′n = 
or, alternatively,
¬q1, . . . ,¬qm, q′1, . . . , q′m′n = 
holds. In the latter case, it follows from the definition of  · n that ¬q1, . . . ,¬qm, q′1, . . . , , q′m′ is a propositionally valid
sequent, hence necessarily an axiom and thus provable as required. So assume that the upper identity holds. This allows us
to write  = τ where
 = ¬♥1p1, . . . ,¬♥kpk,♥′1p′1, . . . ,♥′k′p′k′ ,
where pi, p
′
i′ are tuples of propositional variables according to the arity of ♥i and ♥′i′ , respectively, and τ : V → Fn−1()
is a substitution mapping every component of pi to the corresponding component of Ai, and similarly for p
′
i . Write τn−1 for
the P(Sn−1)-valuation p → τ(p)n−1. Then TSn−1, τn−1 | .
We first prove the second part of the statement. Thus assume that R is one-step cut-free complete. Then from
TSn−1, τn−1 | we conclude by Lemma 4.3 that there exist a one-step rule 1 . . . m/0 ∈ R and a renaming σ : V → V
such that Sn−1, τn−1 | iσ for i = 1, . . . ,m, and 0σ ⊆ . This means that iστ n−1 =  for i = 1, . . . ,m, so that
GRn−1  iστ for i = 1, . . . ,m by induction. Since 0σ ⊆ we can find ∈ S(Fn()) such that 0στ, = τ = ,
which implies that there is a sequent rule 1στ . . . mστ/τ ∈ S(R). We thus obtain GRn   as required.
This finishes the proof of the second claim. To prove the first claim, assume that R is one-step complete. Then there exist
k ≥ 0 and one-step rules l1 . . . lml/l0 ∈ R together with substitutions σl : V → Prop(V) for each l = 1, . . . , k such
that
(i) GC1 +{l0σl | l = 1, . . . , k}  , and hence GCn +Axn−1 +{l0σlτ | l = 1, . . . , k}  τ by the substitution Lemma
3.14
(ii) S, τn−1 | lmσl for all l = 1, . . . , r and allm = 1, . . . ,ml .
As above, we obtain from (ii) by induction that GRCn−1  lmσlτ for all l = 1, . . . r and m = 1, . . . ,ml , whence GRCn 
l0σlτ for 1 ≤ l ≤ r, and thus, by (i) and the fact that all elements of Axn−1 are derivable by induction hypothesis, that
GRCn  τ = . 
Completeness is now an easy corollary.
Corollary 4.14 (Completeness and cut-free completeness). Let R be one-step complete for T andMod(T) |  for a sequent
 ∈ S(F()). Then GRC  . If moreover R is one-step cut-free complete, then GR  .
In particular, this gives us a semantic proof of cut elimination and admissibility of contraction.
Theorem 4.15. Let R be one-step cut-free complete. Then all instances of the cut and contraction rules
, A ,¬A
,
and
, A, A
, A
,
where , ∈ S and A ∈ F(), are admissible in GR.
Proof. This follows directly from soundness and completeness. Clearly, both the contraction rule and the cut-rule are sound.
To see that they are admissible, suppose that X contains all instances of cut and contraction. If GR + X  , we have that
Mod(T) |  hence GR  . 
One may argue that the above semantic proof yields a slightly weaker result than the syntactic proof of Section 5, as we
pre-suppose soundness and completeness w.r.t. a given-structure. However, for every rule set R satisfying the absorption
conditions used in Section 5, we can construct a-structure for which R is one-step sound and one-step cut-free complete
using results of Section 5 and of [26]. We conclude the section by re-visiting our two running examples.
Example 4.16. (i) The set RC of one-step rules axiomatising coalition logic is one-step cut-free complete; we defer the
proof to Example 5.13. As a consequence, cut is admissible in GRC.
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(ii) We leave it to the reader to show that RCK0 is one-step complete either directly or as a corollary to one-step cut-free
completeness of RCK, which we now set out to prove. Let  = {¬(pi ⇒ qi) | i ∈ I} ∪ {p′j ⇒ q′j | j ∈ J}, and let τ be a
P(X)-valuation such that CK(X), τ | . We claim that there exists j ∈ J such that
⋂
i∈Ij
τ(qi) ⊆ τ(q′j), (∗)
where Ij = {i ∈ I | τ(pi) = τ(p′j)}. Assume, for a contradiction, that this is not the case. Then, for every j ∈ J,
⋂
i∈Ij τ(qi) ⊆
τ(q′j). Define the function f : 2(X) → P(X) by
f (S) =
{⋂
i∈Ij τ(qi) S = τ(p′j)
∅ otherwise.
(This is well-defined since Ij = Ik whenever τ(p′j) = τ(p′k).) Then f (τ (pi)) ⊆ τ(qi) for all i ∈ I and f (τ (p′j)) ⊆ q′j for all
j ∈ J, contradicting CK(X), τ | . Having thus proved the claim, we pick j ∈ J satisfying (∗). Writing Ij = {i1, . . . , ik}, we
now derive  using a single instance of the RCK-rule
{¬qi | i ∈ Ij}, q′j ¬p′j, pi1 . . . ¬p′j, pik ¬pi1 , p′j . . . ¬pik , p′j
{¬(pi ⇒ qi) | i ∈ Ij}, pj ⇒ qj ,
whose premises hold in X, τ by (∗) and the definition of Ij .
This proof is easily modified to establish that also the rule set RCKId is one-step cut-free complete forCKId: if is as above,
one proves that there exists j ∈ J satisfying the weaker condition
τ(p′j) ∩
⋂
i∈Ij
τ(qi) ⊆ τ(q′j). (+)
This is proved by constructing f as above, but with
f (τ (p′j)) = τ(p′j) ∩
⋂
i∈Ij
τ(qi),
which defines an element ofCKId(X). From j satisfying (+), one obtains an instance of (CI) that proves. As a consequence,
cut is admissible in GRCK and GRCKId.
5. Cut elimination, syntactically
In the previous section, we have seen that one-step cut-free completeness is a sufficient criterion to ensure that an
ensuing sequent calculus enjoys cut-free completeness, and we have deduced admissibility of contraction on the way. We
now complement these results with a purely syntactic criterion for admissibility of congruence, cut and contraction. As
we will see, syntactic conditions imposed on the set of modal rules under scrutiny will be equivalent to one-step cut-free
completeness.
We start with admissibility of congruence and contraction, which is – unlike weakening and inversion – not automatic,
and only holds if the underlying rule set satisfies an additional property. Recall that GC0 consists of all propositional sequent
rules and the cut-rule, but restricted to purely propositional formulas.
Definition 5.1. A set R of one-step rules absorbs congruence if for every n-ary♥ ∈  and all p1, . . . , pn and q1, . . . , qn ∈ V ,
there exists a rule 1 . . . k/0 and a substitution σ : V → Prop(V) such that 0σ ⊆ {¬♥(p1, . . . , pn),♥(q1, . . . , qn)}
as multisets, and
GC0 + ¬p1, q1 + . . . + ¬pn, qn + p1,¬q1 + . . . + pn,¬qn  iσ
for all i = 1, . . . , k.
The requirement of absorption of congruence essentially amounts to the fact that the congruence rule (Remark 4.4) is
contained in the given set of one-step rules, up to possible weakening of the premises. It is easy to see that this indeed holds
in our examples. As wewill see later, absorption of congruence implies that the congruence rule is admissible in the ensuing
sequent system.
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Example 5.2. We consider the rules presented in Example 4.6. First, suppose that R consists of (N) and (D) only. We claim
that R does not absorb congruence. If this were the case, there would be a rule R = 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R and a substitution
σ : V → Prop(V) such that0σ ⊆ ¬p,q asmultisets and GC0 +¬p, q+ p,¬q  i for all i = 1, . . . , n. Owing to the
fact that R consists of (N) and (D) only, and the inclusion 0σ ⊆ ¬p,q is required to hold in the sense of multisets, the
only choice for R and σ is to take r as necessitation p/p and σ with σ(p) = q. But clearly the substituted premise pσ ≡ q
of the necessitation rule is not provable from the assumptions¬p, q and p,¬q.
The situation is different for the rules (K), as the substitution instance¬p, q/¬p,q of (K) fulfils the requirements of
the definition.
Definition 5.3. A set R of one-step rules absorbs contraction if for every rule 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R and every renaming σ :
V → V , there exists a rule1 . . . m/0 ∈ R and a renaming ρ : V → V such that0ρ ⊆ supp(0σ) (in particular, the
multiset0ρ is a set, i.e.0 is a set and ρ does not identify any literals occurring in0) and
GC0 + {iσ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}  jρ
for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Given any rule r = 1 . . . n/0, a renamingσ : V → V may identify literals in the conclusion0σ of r. In this case,0σ
is a proper super-multiset of its support, and the contraction rule would be needed to conclude supp(0σ) from 0σ . If the
rule set R absorbs contraction, these two deduction steps can be absorbed into the application of a singlemodal rule: we can
find a (generally different) one-step rule s = 1 . . . m/0 togetherwith a renaming that proves the contracted conclusion
supp(0σ) of the original rule with the help of weakening (this amounts to the condition 0ρ ⊆ supp(0σ)). In order to
replace an instance of r by an instance of s, we furthermore need to require that all premises jρ of s are provable, given
the premises iσ of r. Since the premises of a one-step rule have a strictly smaller modal rank than the conclusion, we are
inductively permitted to use the cut-rule in order to prove the conclusionsjρ from the set of premises {1σ, . . . , nσ } of s.
Formally, this is captured by the conditionGC0+{iσ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}  jρ for j = 1, . . . ,m.Wemake this argument precise
when we we prove admissibility of cut and contraction by induction on the modal rank of the endsequent (Proposition 5.6).
For the basic modal logic K , the situation is as follows.
Example 5.4. Consider the rule set R consisting of (N) and (D) introduced in Example 4.6. It is easy to see that R does not
absorb contraction: consider a substitution σ with σ(p) = σ(q) = p and σ(r) = r. This substitution identifies the literals
¬p and ¬q in the conclusion of (D). If R were closed under contraction, there would be a rule R = 1 . . . m/0 and
a substitution ρ such that 0ρ ⊆ {¬p,r} as multisets and GC0 + {¬p,¬p, r}  jρ} for all j = 1, . . . ,m. Then R
must be the necessitation rule p/p, and ρ(p) = r, but of course¬p,¬p, r does not propositionally entail the substituted
premise r of the necessitation rule.
The situation is different if we adopt the rule set (RK), which does absorb contraction as we now show. For the sake of
readability, we treat only the case of a renaming σ that identifies precisely two literals in the conclusion of (RK) (it is readily
seen that this is in fact generally sufficient); w.l.o.g. wemay thus assume that σ identifies the variables pn and pn−1 and acts
as the identity on all other propositional variables, so that we obtain a substitution instance of (RKn) of the form
¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1,¬pn−1, p0
¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1,¬pn−1,p0 . (∗)
Then we take 1 . . . m/0 to be ¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1, p0/¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1,p0, and ρ to be the identity substitution.
Then 0ρ ≡ ¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1,p0 ⊆ supp(¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1,¬pn−1,p0) as multisets, and the premise¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1, p0 of the new rule instance is propositionally entailed by (in fact equivalent to) the premise ¬p1, . . . ,¬pn−1,¬pn−1, p0 of the original rule instance (∗), as required.
The definition of absorption of cut is modelled on the same idea: an application of cut to the conclusions of two one-step
rules r1, r2 can be replaced by a different one-step rule r0 such that all the premises of r0 are propositional consequences of
(i.e. can be derived with the help of cut from) the premises of r1, r2.
Definition 5.5. A set R of one-step rules absorbs cut if for all 1 . . . n/0 and all 1 . . . m/0 ∈ R and all renamings
σ, ρ : V → V such that 0σ = , A and0ρ = ,¬A, there exists a rule1 . . . l/0 and a renaming κ : V → V such
that supp(0κ) ⊆ , and
GC0 + {iσ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} + {iρ | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}  jκ
for all j = 1, . . . , l.
We note that all absorption properties defined above are local in the sense that they can be checked by considering just
the set of modal (one-step) rules, without having to take into account cuts involving propositional rules.
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We formulate admissibility of cut, contraction, and the non-atomic axiom rule in relativised form as follows.
Proposition 5.6. If R absorbs cut, contraction, and congruence, then
• GRn  , A,¬A• GRn  , A whenever GRn  , A, A• GRn   whenever GRCn  
for all  ∈ S(Fn()) and all A ∈ Fn().
Proof. Weproceed by induction on n, where the base case n = 0 is just a collection of known statements aboutG. For n > 0,
we note that, as a consequence of Lemma 3.9, GRn   iff Gn + H   where
H = {0σ, | 1 . . . k/0 ∈ R, σ : v → Fn−1(),∀1≤i≤k(GRn−1  iσ)}
for all  ∈ S(Fn()).
We first show that GRn  , A,¬A. By definition of Fn(), we have that , A,¬A ∈ S(Prop((Fn−1() ∪ V)))
and therefore , A,¬A = ′σ, Bσ,¬Bσ for a formula B ∈ Prop(V), a sequent ′ ∈ S(Prop(V)), and a substitution
σ : V → (Fn−1()) ∪ V . By admissibility of the non-atomic axiom rule in G, we have G0  ′,¬B, B. The claim
will thus follow from the more general statement that G0   implies that GRn  σ for all  ∈ S(Prop(V)) and all
σ : V → (Fn−1())∪ V , which we prove by induction on the proof of G0  . The interesting case, in which absorption
of congruence is needed, is  = ¬p, p, ′, i.e.  is an axiom. We show that GRn  pσ,¬pσ,′σ , for which it suffices
to establish that that GRn  ¬pσ, pσ by admissibility of weakening (Lemma 3.11). As σ takes values in (Fn−1()) ∪ V
and the case σ(p) ∈ V is readily discharged by the (atomic) axiom rule, we may assume that σ(p) = ♥(A1, . . . , Ak)
where A1, . . . , Ak ∈ Fn−1(). By absorption of congruence, we may find a rule 1 . . . l/0 and a substitution ρ : V →
Prop(V) such that GC0 + ¬p1, q1 + . . . + ¬pk, qk + p1,¬q1 + . . . + pk,¬qk  iρ for i = 1, . . . , l, and 0ρ ⊆♥(p1, . . . , pk),¬♥(p1, . . . , pk). By substitutivity (Lemma 3.14) this entails that GRCn−1 + Axn−1  iρτ for i = 1, . . . , l
where τ(pi) = τ(qi) = Ai. By the induction hypothesis, cutmay be eliminated and all elements ofAxn are GRn−1-derivable,
hence GRn−1  iρτ . Therefore, GRn  0ρτ , and hence GRn  ♥(A1, . . . , Ak),¬♥(A1, . . . , Ak) by weakening (Lemma
3.11). This finishes the inductive case for the axiom rule. The cases for the other rules are standard; as an example, we deal
with the case that (∧) is the last rule applied in the proof ofG0  . Then = (B0∧B1),  and bothG0  B0, ,G0  B1, .
As these proofs are shorter, we may apply the induction hypothesis to obtain that GRn  B0σ, σ and GRn  B1σ, σ ,
whence GRn  (B0 ∧ B1)σ, σ as required.
We now deal with contraction. So suppose that GRn  , or equivalently, Gn +H  withH as above. Strengthening the
claim, we show that GRn  supp() by induction on the Gn-proof of  from the additional assumptions in H. First suppose
that ∈ H, that is, = 0σ, for1 . . . k/0 ∈ R,H ∈ S(Fn()), andσ : V → Fn−1().Wemay factoriseσ = σm◦σe
where σe : V → V is a renaming and σm : V → Fn−1() is an injective substitution. As R absorbs contraction, we can find
a rule1 . . . l/0 and a renaming ρ : V → V such that0ρ ⊆ supp(0σe) and GC0 + {iσe | i = 1, . . . , k}  jρ for
j = 1, . . . , l. By substitutivity (Lemma 3.14) this entails
GRCn−1 + Axn−1 + {iσeσm | i = 1, . . . , k}  jρσm
for j = 1, . . . , l.
As all elements of Axn−1 as well as the additional assumptions iσeσm are GRn−1-derivable, we conclude that GRCn−1 
jρσm for all j = 1, . . . , l, and hence GRn−1  jρσm by induction. Thus, GRn  0ρσm. As σm is injective and 0ρ ⊆
supp(0σe), we have 0ρσm ⊆ supp(0σeσm) = supp(0σ). By weakening (Lemma 3.11) we finally obtain GRn 
supp().
The remaining cases, where  has been proved using rules of Gn, are standard, and we exemplify the argument for the
case of the (¬∧)-rule. Suppose that Gn+H   has a proof of depth h and (¬∧)was the last rule applied in this proof. Then
 = ,¬(B ∧ C) and Gn + H  ,¬B,¬C with a proof of depth < h. We distinguish two cases. First, if ¬(B ∧ C) /∈ ,
we have, by induction hypothesis (and possibly an application of weakening), that Gn + H  supp(),¬B,¬C whence
Gn +H  supp(),¬(B∧ C) = supp(,¬(B∧ C)) = supp(). Now consider the case¬(B∧ C) ∈ , i.e. the multiplicity
of ¬(B ∧ C) in  is m > 0. By repeated application of inversion (Lemma 3.12) we have that Gn + H  0, 1 where
1 consists of m + 1 copies each of ¬B and ¬C and 0 arises by removing all m occurrences of ¬(B ∧ C) from , with a
proof of depth < h. By induction, it follows that Gn + H  supp(0),¬B,¬C whence Gn + H  supp(0),¬(B ∧ C) =
supp(0,¬(B ∧ C)) = supp(,¬(B ∧ C)) as required.
We turn to admissibility of cut, where it suffices to show that GRn  , whenever GRn  , A and GRn  ,¬A. If
this is the case, we find that Gn + H  , A and Gn + H  ,¬A with H as above. We show that Gn + H  , using
the classical double induction method, with outer induction on the rank of the cut formula A and inner induction on the
sum of the size of the proof trees of Gn + H  , A and Gn + H  ,¬A. We distinguish three different types of cut: (a)
cuts between elements of H, (b) cuts between elements of H and conclusions of Gn-rules and (c) cuts between conclusions
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of Gn-rules. As regards (a), we have that , A = 0σ, ′ and,¬A = 0ρ,′ for two substitutions σ, ρ : V → Fn−1()
and two rules 1 . . . k/0 and 1 . . . l/0 ∈ R. In case A ∈ ′ or ¬A ∈ ′, we are done immediately as , ∈ H. To
see this in the case A ∈ ′ suppose that′ = A, ′′. Then, = 0σ, ′′,  ∈ H. The case¬A ∈ ′ is entirely analogous.
The remaining case is that A ∈ 0σ and¬A ∈ 0ρ . As R absorbs cut, we may use the substitution Lemma 3.14 to find a
rule1 . . . m/0 and a substitution κ : V → Fn−1() such that supp(0κ) ⊆ , and
GCn−1 + Axn−1 + {iσ | i = 1, . . . , k} + {jρ | j = 1, . . . , l}  jκ
for all j = 1, . . . ,m. As all elements of Axn−1 and all assumptions iσ (i = 1, . . . k) and jρ (j = 1, . . . , l) are GRn−1-
derivable and cut is admissible in GRn−1 by induction hypothesis, we have that GRn−1  jκ for all j = 1, . . . ,m. As
contraction is admissible in GRn, we finally obtain GRn  supp(0κ0) ⊆ ,, and GRn  , follows from the relativised
weakening Lemma 3.11.
We now look at cuts of type (b), that is, cuts between propositional rules and hypotheses in H. We treat the case that
, A = 0σ, ′ ∈ H and ,¬A has been derived using a propositional rule (the case ,¬A ∈ H is almost identical but
slightly simpler, as it leaves fewer cases for A). If A ∈ ′, that is, ′ = ′′, A, the cut happens on a formula in the weakening
context ′ and we have , = 0σ, ′′,  ∈ H whence Gn + H  ,. Now suppose that A ∈ 0σ , i.e. 0σ = A, ′′.
We proceed by a case distinction over the last rule applied in the proof of Gn + H  ,¬A.
Rule (∧): Since A occurs in the conclusion of a modal rule, A is not of the form B ∧ C, so that necessarily = ′, B ∧ C,
and we have Gn + H  ′, B,¬A and Gn + H  ′, C,¬A with shorter proofs. By the inner induction hypothesis, cutting
the latter two endsequents with , A is admissible, that is, Gn + H  ,′, B and Gn + H  ,′, C. Applying (∧) yields
Gn + H  ,′, B ∧ C = ,.
Rule (¬∧): As in the previous case, necessarily = ′,¬(B∧ C) and GR  ′,¬B,¬C,¬Awith a shorter proof. Again
by the inner induction hypothesis, cuts on Awith the latter endsequent are admissible, that is, Gn +H  ,′,¬B,¬C and
consequently Gn + H  ,′,¬(B ∧ C) = ,.
Rule (¬¬): First suppose that¬A is principal whence A = ¬A′ andGn+H  , A′ with a shorter proof.Wemay nowuse
the inner induction hypothesis to obtain Gn +H  , by an admissible cut on A′. Now suppose that¬A is not principal in
the application of (¬¬). Then = ′,¬¬B, and Gn +H  ′, B,¬Awith a shorter proof. Again using the inner induction
hypothesis, an admissible cut on A yields Gn + H  ′, B, , and applying (¬¬) yields Gn + H  ′,¬¬B,  = ,.
Rule (Ax): As in the case for (∧), necessarily = p,¬p, ′′. Then , = , p,¬p, ′′ is again an axiom and Gn +H 
,.
This finishes the case of cuts of type (b). The elimination of cuts of type (c) between conclusions of propositional rules is
standard, and follows from the GRn-admissibility of contraction (that we have already established) and the inversion lemma
3.13. 
The following theorem, which readily follows from Propositions 5.6 and 3.15, therefore provides a purely syntactic coun-
terpart of Theorem 4.15.
Theorem 5.7. If R absorbs cut, contraction and congruence, then all instances of the cut and contraction rules
, A ,¬A
,
, A, A
, A
,
where , ∈ S and A ∈ F(), are admissible in GR.
Our lastmain result in this section is that in the presence of one-step completeness, the absorption properties are actually
equivalent with one-step cut-free completeness, the condition used in the semantic proof of cut eliminability. We split the
equivalence into two separate lemmas.
Proposition 5.8. Let R be one-step complete. Then R is one-step cut-free complete if R absorbs cut and contraction.
Proof. Let X be a set, and let τ be a P(X)-valuation. Consider the set
 = {0σ, |  ∈ S((V)), 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R, σ : V → Prop(V),∀1≤i≤n(X, τ | iσ)}.
As rule conclusions do not contain top-level propositional connectives, is trivially closed under inversion. Moreover, is
closed under weakening, i.e.  ∈  implies that , ∈  for ∈ S((V)).
We now establish that  is closed under contraction, i.e.  ∈  implies that supp() ∈  . If  ∈  , we can find a
rule 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R and a substitution σ : V → Prop(V) such that X, τ | iσ for all i = 1, . . . , n and  = 0σ, ′
for some ′ ∈ S((V)). It suffices to show that supp(0σ) ∈  , as  is closed under weakening. The idea is to replace
every (propositional) formula A occurring in 0σ by a propositional variable pA and then use absorption of contraction. We
therefore choose pairwise distinct propositional variables pA for all A ∈ {σ(p) | p ∈ V} and consider the renaming σ0
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defined by σ0(p) = pσ(p). We may moreover choose an injective substitution θ that satisfies θ(pA) = A. This allows us to
factor σ = θ ◦ σ0. Using the fact that R absorbs contraction, we now find a rule1 . . . m/0 and a renaming ρ : V → V
such that0ρ ⊆ supp(0σ0) and
GC0 + {iσ0 | i = 1, . . . , n}  jρ
for all j = 1, . . . ,m. As X, τ | iσ for all i = 1, . . . , n we have that X, τ | jρθ for j = 1, . . . ,m by soundness of
propositional reasoning. Hence 0ρθ ∈  . As 0ρ ⊆ supp(0σ0) and θ is injective, we have 0ρθ ⊆ supp(0σ0θ) =
supp(0σ). This shows that supp(0σ) ∈  as required.
Next,we showthat is closedunder cut, i.e. assuming that, Aand,¬Aare inweshowthat, ∈  . Bydefinition,
we have rules 1 . . . n/0 and 1 . . . m/0 ∈ R and substitutions σ, ρ : V → Prop(V) such that X, τ | iσ and
X, τ | jτ for i = 1, . . . n and j = 1, . . . ,m, as well as
, A = 0σ, ′ and,¬A = 0τ,′
for some ′, ′ ∈ S((V)). In case A ∈ ′ we have , = 0σ, for some ∈ S((V)) so there is nothing to show. By
the same argument, we are done if¬A ∈ ′, so we can assume that A ∈ 0σ and¬A ∈ 0τ . Thus, we have
0 = B, ′′ and0 = ¬C, ′′
with Bσ = A = Cτ . As above,we choose pairwise distinct propositional variables pA for allA ∈ {σ(p) | p ∈ V}∪{τ(p) | p ∈
V} and pick an injective substitution θ : V → Prop(V) such that θ(pA) = A. If σ0, τ0 : V → V are defined by σ0(p) = pσ(p)
and τ0(p) = pτ(p), we can factor σ = θ ◦ σ0 and τ = θ ◦ τ0. Moreover, Bσ0 = Cτ0 by injectivity of θ . We may therefore
invoke absorption of cut to find a rule1 . . . l/0 and a renaming κ : V → V such that supp(0κ) ⊆ ′′σ0, ′′τ0 and
GC0 + {iσ0 | i = 1, . . . , n} + {iτ0 | i = 1, . . . ,m}  kκ
for all k = 1, . . . , l. Soundness ofGC0 nowentails thatX, τ | kκθ for all k = 1, . . . , l asX, τ | iσ0θ andX, τ | jτ0θ
for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m; therefore0κθ ∈  . Applying θ to the inclusion supp(0κ) ⊆ ′′σ0, ′′τ0 we obtain
supp(0κθ) ⊆ , (recall that, A = 0σ, ′ = A, ′′σ, ′ and,¬A = ¬A, ′′τ,′). As is closedunderweakening
and contraction, we obtain that , ∈  as claimed.
Finally, we establish that R is one-step cut-free complete, using the criterion of Lemma 4.3. So let  ∈ S((V)), and let
τ : V → P(X) such that TX, τ | . We need to show that there exist 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R and a renaming σ : V → V such
that 0σ ⊆  and X, τ | i, σ , i = 1, . . . , n. As R is one-step complete, GC1 +  . By Lemma 5.9 below, we conclude
 ∈  , which finishes the proof. 
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.8 we need to supply the following lemma.
Lemma 5.9. Let ⊆ S((V)) be closed under cut, contraction, weakening, and inversion. Then GC1 +   iff G1 +  .
In particular, for  ∈ S((V)), we have GC1 +    iff  ∈  .
Proof. This is a standard cut-elimination proof for Gwhere the fact that is closed under cut, contraction, weakening, and
inversion allows propagating instances of the respective rules to the leaves; see [29, Section 4.4] for details. 
The converse of Proposition 5.8 requires more semantic considerations. We start with a simple property of the semantics
of propositional logic.
LemmaandDefinition 5.10. LetH ⊆ S(Prop(V)). Let X0 = 2V ,where2 is the set {⊥,} truth values, and let τ0 : V → P(X0)
be givenby τ(a) = {κ | κ(a) = }. The canonicalmodel ofH is the pair X, τ definedbyX = ⋂∈H τ0X0 and τ(p) = τ0(p)∩X.
Then X, τ |  iff GC0 + H   for every  ∈ S(Prop(V)); in particular, X, τ |  for all ∈ H.
Proof. The statement reduces immediately to the case that is a single formula A andH contains a single sequent consisting
of a single formula B. By soundness and completeness of GC0, it suffices to show that X, τ | A iff B → A is a propositional
tautology. As by construction, X, τ | A iff X0, τ0 | B → A, this reduces to showing that for all A ∈ Prop(V), X0, τ0 | A
iff A is a propositional tautology. This follows from the more general claim, proved by an easy induction over the structure
of A, that for κ ∈ 2V , κ ∈ Aτ0X0 iff A evaluates to true under the valuation κ . 
We can now show that one-step cut-free completeness entails the absorption properties.
Proposition 5.11. Let R be one-step sound and one-step cut-free complete. Then R absorbs cut and contraction.
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Proof. We first establish that R absorbs contraction. So let 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R, and let σ : V → V be a renaming. We have
to show that there exists a rule1 . . . m/0 and a renaming ρ : V → V such that0ρ ⊆ supp(0σ) and
GC0 + {iσ | i = 1, . . . , n}  jρ
for all j = 1, . . . ,m. Let X, τ be the canonical model of {1σ, . . . , nσ } according to Lemma 5.10. By one-step soundness,
TX, τ | 0σ , and hence TX, τ | supp(0σ). Since R is one-step cut-free complete, we can find a rule1 . . . m/0 and
a renaming ρ : V → V such that X, τ | iρ for i = 1, . . . ,m and0ρ ⊆ supp(0σ). By Lemma 5.10,
GC0 + {iσ | i = 1, . . . , n}  jτ
for j = 1, . . . ,m as required.
We use a very similar argument to show that R absorbs cut. If 1 . . . n/0 and 1 . . . m/0 ∈ R and σ, ρ : V → V
are renamings with 0σ = , A and 0ρ = ,¬A, let X, τ be the canonical model of {1σ, . . . , nσ,1ρ, . . . , mρ}.
By one-step soundness, TX, τ | ,, and by one-step cut-free completeness we find a rule1 . . . l/0 and a renaming
κ : V → V such that X, τ | iκ for i = 1, . . . , l and0κ ⊆ ,. By Lemma 5.10
GC0 + {iσ | i = 1, . . . , n} + {iρ | i = 1, . . . ,m}  jκ
for j = 1, . . . , l as required. 
Taken together, Propositions 5.11 and 5.8 establish that under one-step completeness, one-step cut-free completeness is
equivalent to absorption of cut and contraction. The syntactic proof of cut elimination (Proposition 5.6 and Theorem 5.7)
however requires a third condition: absorption of congruence. We now show that this condition is also implied by one-step
cut-free completeness. (Note that this does not imply that absorption of congruence follows from absorption of cut and
contraction.)
Proposition 5.12. Suppose that R is one-step cut-free complete. Then R absorbs congruence.
Proof. Let♥ ∈  be an n-arymodal operator, pick propositional variables p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn ∈ V , and let denote the
sequent ¬♥(p1, . . . , pn),♥(q1, . . . , qn). Let X, τ be the canonical model of H = {¬pi, qi | i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {¬qi, pi | i =
1, . . . , n} according to Lemma 5.10. Then TX, τ | . By one-step cut-free completeness, we have a rule 1 . . . m/0 ∈ R
and a renaming σ : V → V such that X, τ | jσ for all j = 1, . . . ,m and 0σ ⊆ . By Lemma 5.10,
GC0 + H  jσ
as required. 
Example 5.13. In order to discharge the pending proof of one-step cut-free completeness for the set RC of one-step rules
axiomatising coalition logic, we can proceed as in [28].Mutatis mutandis, it has been shown in [28] that RC absorbs cut and
contraction. By Proposition 5.8, it remains to prove one-step completeness. As noted in [28], one-step completeness follows
from Proposition 3.2 in [20]; however, we now have to pay attention to the fact that we modified the semantics of coalition
logic by restricting to finite sets of strategies. For finite sets of outcomes, the proof of Proposition 3.2 in [20] constructs finite
sets of strategies (and then, of course, strategies can be assumed to be natural numbers). In otherwords, the said proof shows
that RC is one-step complete on finite sets w.r.t. C. By Proposition 4.5, this is sufficient to establish one-step completeness.
We conclude the section with a short methodological digression on the construction of cut-free complete rule sets.
Remark 5.14. The syntactic approach to cut elimination provides uswith amethodology to construct cut-free complete rule
sets. Any one-step complete system of rules can be turned into a one-step cut-free complete system by adding instances of
cut and contraction until both cut and contraction are absorbed (the question is onlywhether there is a tractable description
of the resulting rule set). It is evident that this preserves one-step soundness.
6. Applications
This section presents, froma syntactic viewpoint, some applications of cut-free completeness ofGR for a one-step cut-free
complete set R of one-step rules. The first application, the subformula property, is immediate:
Theorem 6.1. Let R be a set of one-step rules. Then GR has the subformula property, i.e. every deduction GR   only mentions
subformulas, or negations thereof, of formulas occurring in .
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Proof. By induction on the derivation of GR  , where both the case of propositional connectives and the application of
an instance of a one-step rule are immediate by the rule format. 
As a consequence, we obtain alternative proofs of two results of [25] regarding conservativity and complexity of coalge-
braic logics.
Corollary 6.2 (Conservativity). Let0 ⊆  be a sub-similarity type, and letR be one-step sound and one-step cut-free complete
for a -structure T. If R0 consists of those 1 . . . n/0 ∈ R for which 0 ∈ S(0(V)), then GR0 is complete for T as a 0-
structure.
Proof. Let  be a valid sequent over F(0). Then GR  . By the subformula property, all rules used in this derivation
belong to R0. 
As the design of the system GR is such that the logical complexity of the formula strictly decreases when passing from
conclusion to premise, these systems can be used to establish both decidability and complexity of the satisfiability problem.
Simply put, proof search in GR terminates if for every sequent  there are only finitely many substitution instances of rule
conclusions equal towith properly different premises. Ifmoreover rules can be represented by codes in such away that one
only needs to consider rules of polynomial-sized codes in , and the rule set satisfies some additional sanity conditions, we
say that the rule set is PSPACE-tractable; we refer to [25, Definition 6.12] for the exact definition. Under PSPACE-tractability,
proof search in GR can be performed in polynomial space using a depth-first strategy. We thus re-prove the main result
(Theorem 6.13) of [25], which is reformulated as follows in the sequent calculus setting used in the present work.
Theorem 6.3. Let R be one-step sound and one-step cut-free complete. If moreover R is PSPACE-tractable, then the satisfiability
problem for F() w.r.t.Mod(T) is decidable in polynomial space.
Cut-free proof calculi also provide all the necessary scaffolding to prove Craig interpolation by induction on cut-free
proofs. We recall that FV(A) denotes the set of propositional variables occurring in A ∈ F(), and similarly for sequents.
Interpolation then takes the following form:
Definition 6.4. F() has the Craig Interpolation Property (CIP) with respect to Mod(T) if whenever Mod(T) | A → B
for A, B ∈ F(), then there exists an interpolant F ∈ F() such that Mod(T) | A → F , Mod(T) | F → B and
FV(F) ⊆ FV(A) ∩ FV(B).
Syntactic proofs of the CIP proceed by induction on cut-free proofs. The following definition introduces the necessary
terminology.
Definition 6.5. A split sequent is a pair (0, 1) of sequents, written 0 | 1. We say that 0 | 1 is a splitting of  if
 = 0, 1. A formula F is an interpolant of a split sequent 0 | 1 if FV(F) ⊆ FV(0) ∩ FV(1), GR  0, F , and
GR  ¬F, 1. We say that a sequent  admits interpolation if every splitting of  has an interpolant. The system GR has the
Craig interpolation property (CIP) if every derivable sequent admits interpolation.
The idea of the syntactic proof of Craig interpolation [29, Chapter 4], in contrast to the semantic proofs via amalgamation
(see [14] for the case of normal modal logics and [11] for monotone modal logic) is to construct interpolants inductively
– clearly this fails in the presence of the cut-rule. Completeness provides the link between the syntactic and the semantic
versions of the CIP.
Proposition 6.6. Let R be one-step sound and one-step cut-free complete w.r.t the -structure T. Then GR has the CIP iff F()
has the CIP with respect toMod(T).
Proof. Toprove ‘if’, letGR  , and let0 | 1 beasplittingof. By soundness,Mod(T) | (¬ˇ0) → ˇ1. Therefore,wehave
F ∈ F() such that FV(F) ⊆ FV(ˇ0) ∩ FV(ˇ1) = FV(0) ∩ FV(1),Mod(T) | (¬ˇ0) → F , andMod(T) | F → ˇ1.
By cut-free completeness (Section 4), GR  0, F and GR  ¬F, 1, i.e. F is the required interpolant of 0, 1. ‘Only if’ is
proved similarly. 
Inductive proofs of the CIP for GR are often straightforward. Below, we show that the systems used in our running
examples, coalition logic and conditional logic have the CIP. For coalition logic, this is not a new result [10] but our proof is
shorter due to the smaller number of modal proof rules. For the conditional logics CK and CK + ID the CIP is – to the best of
our knowledge – a new result which was explicitly left as future work in [17], where a substantially different proof calculus
is used.
The proof of the CIP in both examples benefits from the following notions.
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Definition 6.7. A sequent rule 1 . . . n/0 supports interpolation if 0 admits interpolation provided all of 1, . . . , n
admit interpolation. A set S of sequent rules supports interpolation if all rules in S support interpolation.
As it iswell known (and shown, e.g. in [29]) that all (instances of) rules ofG support interpolation, the following is evident.
Lemma 6.8. If S(R) supports interpolation, then GR has the CIP.
Moreover, we may restrict ourselves to rule instances without context formulas:
Lemma 6.9. The set S(R) supports interpolation iff for every rule 1 . . . n/0 in R and every substitution σ : V → F(), the
sequent rule 1σ . . . nσ/0σ supports interpolation.
Proof. Let 1 . . . n/0 be a one-step rule in R, let σ : V → F() be a substitution, and let be a sequent. Moreover, let
iσ admit interpolation for all i = 1, . . . , n; we have to show that the arising rule conclusion 0σ, admits interpolation.
Every splitting of 0σ, is of the form 
0
0σ,0 | 10σ,1, where 00σ | 10σ is a splitting of 0σ and 0 | 1 is a
splitting of . By assumption, 0σ admits interpolation, so that there exists an interpolant F for the splitting 
0
0σ | 10σ .
By admissibility of weakening, F is also an interpolant for the given splitting of 0σ,. 
We turn to our running examples:
Theorem 6.10. Coalition logic, i.e. the system GC, has the CIP.
Proof. By the above lemmas, we only have to check that the given one-step rules support interpolation.
Rule (A). If S = ¬[C0]A0 | ¬[C1]A1 is a splitting of the (substituted) rule conclusion (recall the notation of Example 3.6)
and F is an interpolant of ¬A0 | ¬A1, then G = [∪C0]F is an interpolant of S: From ¬F,¬A1, we deduce ¬G,¬[C1]A1 by
rule (A), whose side condition is met as∪C0 and the elements of C1 are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, from¬A0, F we deduce¬[C0]A0, G by rule (B), where, in the notation of the rule, we match G to the literal [D]B, and the side condition is met by
construction of G.
Rule (B). There are two cases to distinguish, depending on which part of the splitting the literal [D]B belongs to. First
consider splittings of the rule conclusion of the form
S = ¬[C0]A0, [D]B, [N]B0 | ¬[C1]A1, [N]B1.
If F is an interpolant of ¬A0, B, B0 | ¬A1, B1, then ¬[∪C1]¬F is an interpolant of S: from ¬A0, F, B, B0 we first de-
rive ¬A0,¬¬F, B, B0 and then ¬[C0]A0,¬[∪C1]¬F, [D]B, [N]B0 using rule (B). Moreover, from ¬A1,¬F, B1 we derive¬[C1]A1, [∪C1]¬F, [N]B1 using rule (B), and further¬[C1]A1,¬¬[∪C1]¬F, [N]B1.
Now consider a splitting of the rule conclusion of the form
S = ¬[C0]A0, [N]B0 | ¬[C1]A1, [D]B, [N]B1.
In this case, if F is an interpolant of ¬A0, B0 | ¬A1, B, B1, then [∪C0]F is an interpolant of S: from ¬A0, F, B0, we derive
R¬[C0]A0, [∪C0]F, [N]B0 by rule (B), and from¬F,¬A1, B, B1 we derive¬[∪C0]F,¬[C1]A1, [D]B, [N]B1 by rule (B). 
By a similar argument we establish the CIP for the conditional logics CK and CK + ID.
Theorem 6.11. The conditional logics CK and CK + ID have the CIP.
Proof. First consider GCK; we have to show that rule (C) supports interpolation. First consider splittings of the rule con-
clusion of the form S = ¬(A0 ⇒ B0), A ⇒ B | ¬(A1 ⇒ B1). If F is an interpolant of ¬B0, B | ¬B1, then ¬(A ⇒ ¬F)
is an interpolant of S. Now consider splittings of the form S = ¬(A0 ⇒ B0) | ¬(A1 ⇒ B1), A ⇒ B. If F interpolates¬B0 | ¬B1, B then A ⇒ F interpolates S.
We now consider interpolation for GCKId, which follows the same pattern. To show that the rule (CI) supports interpola-
tion, first consider a splitting of the conclusion of (CI) of the form S = ¬(A0 ⇒ B0), A ⇒ B | ¬(A1 ⇒ B1). If F is an inter-
polant of¬A0,¬B0, B | ¬B1, then¬(A ⇒ ¬F) is an interpolant of S. Similarly, if S = ¬(A0 ⇒ B0) | ¬(A1 ⇒ B1), A ⇒ B
and F interpolates¬B0 | ¬B1, B,¬A then A ⇒ F interpolates S. 
7. Conclusions
We have shown that local absorption of congruence, contraction, and cut by a system of modal one-step rules auto-
matically results in a sequent system that admits cut, and that under a localised completeness assumption the sequent
system is (cut-free) complete w.r.t. coalgebraic semantics, a result which applies to many and widely differing examples of
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modal logics found in the literature. Cut free sequent systems are the key to a number of typical applications, including in
particular proofs of the Craig interpolation property (CIP) which plays an important role in themodularisation of proofs. We
have established the CIP for our two running examples; here, the CIP for the conditional logics CK and CK + ID is apparently
a new result. It remains an open problem to find a quickly verifiable general criterion for a set of rules, or, semantically, a
coalgebraic modal logic, to have the CIP. It is worthwhile to point out that for coalition logic, the inductive step in the proof
of the CIP is not entirely straightforward as the newly constructed interpolant uses a modality that does not necessarily
appear in the rule at hand. We phrase this problem explicitly as:
Open Problem 7.1. Find easily verifiable and general semantic or syntactic criteria for a coalgebraic modal logic to have the CIP.
Second, we have observed that the crucial notion of absorption of cut by a set of rules is reflected semantically by what
we have termed one-step cut-free completeness. The purely syntactic approach to cut elimination via local absorption of
cut carries over to logics outside rank 1 [19] (see [27] for an exact definition of coalgebraic modal logics with general, i.e. not
necessarily rank-1, frame conditions). Contrastingly, it is unclear which semantic criteria would apply in the general case.
We formulate this explicitly as:
Open Problem 7.2. Find semantic criteria for a coalgebraic modal logic with general frame conditions to admit cut elimination.
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